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INTRODUCTION  
This paper seeks to give an in-depth account of willful ignorance. For some time, the notion of                 
willful ignorance has been a topic for scholars of law and those involved in philosophy of law                 
(Charlow 1992; Husak 2010; Lynch 2016; Sarch 2015, 2017). Concurrently, an ​epistemology of             
ignorance has recently been a topic for (feminist) social epistemologists (Alcoff 2007; Bailey             
2007; Code 2007; Fricker 2016; Harding 2006; Medina 2013, 2016; Pohlhaus 2012; Townley             
2006, 2011; Tuana 2004, 2006; Tuana & Sullivan 2006; Wieland 2017), and critical race              
theorists (Mills 1997, 2007, 2017; Dotson 2011, 2012; Sullivan & Tuana 2007) working in              
different fields of philosophy.​1 Yet, even before the term ‘willful ignorance’ was coined,             
philosophers were discussing what it meant for one to be willfully ​ignorant. In ​Summa              
Theologiae​, Thomas Aquinas suggests that ignorance is ​voluntary “when it regards that which             
one can and ought to know” (1-2.6, 8.). More recently, Michele Moody-Adams (1994) suggests              
that ​affected ignorance is “essentially a matter of choosing not to be informed of what we can                 
and should know” (1994: 301). It is this notion of voluntary (or affected) ignorance I wish to take                  
up in this paper, a phenomenon which I will refer to as ​willful ignorance​.  
Although the notion of willful ignorance has been given significant attention, the idea of              
a kind of ​praiseworthy ​willful ignorance has been grossly overlooked.​2 In the first section of this                
paper, I will define willful ignorance and address a puzzle concerning how ​willful ignorance is               
possible. In the second section, I will distinguish between willful ignorance that is ​blameworthy              
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 and willful ignorance that is ​praiseworthy​. Whereas the first section will be concerned with              
defining willful ignorance, the second section will consider the moral dimension of willful             
ignorance. In the third section, I argue that a distinguishing feature of blameworthy willful              
ignorance is its close relationship (making it sometimes appear synonymous) with self-deception.            
Here, I wish to show that ​blameworthy willful ignorance always involves some self-deception;             
while ​praiseworthy willful ignorance never involves self-deception. Finally, the fourth section of            
this paper will be committed to addressing objections that could be brought against my account. 
This paper aims to accomplish three major tasks, these are (1) propose an adequate              
definition of willful ignorance (one that holds for instances of blameworthy ​and praiseworthy             
willful ignorance), (2) show that there are (at least) two kinds of willful ignorance,​3 and (3)                
illuminate the fact that blameworthy willful ignorance always involves a cognitive element,            
namely, self-deception. It is also my aim, following philosophers like Cynthia Townley (2006,             
2011), that my positive account of willful ignorance will help to challenge the ​epistemophilia​4              
that permeates Western epistemology. That is to say, I hope this paper can help defend the notion                 
that​ ​knowing isn’t always better than not knowing.  
 
I. WILLFUL IGNORANCE 
In the first part of this section, I propose an answer to the seemingly paradoxical nature of willful                  
ignorance. That is, I will explain how one can be ​knowingly ignorant of some proposition ​p​.                
Whereafter, I provide a definition of willful ignorance, one that is meant to hold for instances of                 
blameworthy ​and​ praiseworthy willful ignorance.  
 
1.1. How is Willful Ignorance Possible? 
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 The term ​willful ignorance might initially strike the reader as paradoxical. On one hand, if a                
subject, ​S​, ​knows they are avoiding some proposition ​p​, we might assume that ​S ​is not ​ignorant                 
of ​p ​(because ​S must know what ​p entails if they know to avoid it). And on the other hand, if ​S                      
does ​not know they are avoiding some proposition ​p​, then we cannot consider ​S to be properly                 
willful in their ignorance of ​p ​. In the first case, ​S ​knows and is therefore not properly ‘ignorant,’                  
and in the second case, ​S ​does not know and we cannot properly call this ignorance ‘willful’.                 
How is it possible that one can be ​willfully ignorant​ toward some proposition ​p​? 
Philosophers have proposed different solutions to this paradox. For instance, Kevin           
Lynch (2016) proposes that one needs a ​suspicion (that proposition ​p might be the case), in order                 
to be considered willfully ignorant and takes it to be “uncontroversial that in willful ignorance,               
the doxastic attitude of ​S towards ​p can be a suspicion” (2016: 509). However, in opposition to                 
Lynch, Jan Willem Wieland proposes that one need not have a specific doxastic attitude toward               
some proposition ​p ​(in order to be considered willfully ignorant), but that knowledge of ​p ​must                
be ​inconvenient ​for ​S​ (2017: 115).  
I agree with Wieland regarding the first matter mentioned above and diverge from him on               
the second. First, I agree that one does not need to add a suspicion requirement to willful                 
ignorance because, surely, one can be willfully ignorant without suspicion. For instance, say a              
parent receives an email from their child's school stating that they have received an influx of new                 
students, all of whom are ​deathly allergic to peanuts. The parent glances at the email in their                 
inbox, decides it’s most likely spam, and puts it into their trash folder. Later that week, the same                  
parent receives a voicemail from the school. The voicemail begins by stating that the information               
which follows concerns ​all parents and ​all ​students, but is especially sensitive because it              
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 concerns children with allergies who attend the school. The parent immediately presses ‘next’ on              
their voicemail, and rationalizes ‘My kid doesn’t have allergies, so this voicemail doesn’t             
concern me.’ A month later the parent receives a flyer from the school in the mail, the front                  
cover reads ‘Health Awareness: ​Parents, Please Read’ alongside a picture of three smiling             
toddlers. The parent immediately throws the flyer in the recycle bin and thinks ‘Gosh! The               
precautions these schools have to take nowadays.’ In this example, it is clear that the parent                
doesn’t have a ​suspicion that there are school children with deathly peanut allergies, only that               
peanut allergies ​might be the case​.  
Someone might make the argument that the above is an example of ​ignorance​, but not               
willful ignorance​. However, we can imagine that the example continues: Two months from             
having received the flyer (which the parent did not read), the school asks the parent to send some                  
baked goods with their child for a fundraiser. The parent thinks this is a perfect opportunity to                 
use their grandmother’s chocolate chip and peanut butter cookie recipe. The parent sends their              
child to school with the cookies and another child, who is allergic to peanuts, eats one of the                  
cookies and is sent to the hospital. The continuation of this example makes it apparent that the                 
parent was willfully ignorant of ​p​, as they voluntarily ignored that which they ​could and ​should                
have known. ​5 Further, this particular illustration is an example of ​blameworthy willful ignorance,             
reasons for which will become clearer in section II of this paper.  
Concerning Wieland’s second suggestion, that knowledge of ​p ​must be ​inconvenient ​for            
S ​, I must diverge from his account. Wieland claims that “what all [willful ignorant] cases seem to                 
have in common is that the agent wants to remain ignorant because it is ​convenient to do so,                  
while knowledge of ​p is inconvenient” (2017: 110). I believe that Wieland uses the word               
4 
 ‘in/convenient’ because his is an account of blameworthy willful ignorance. This is apparent in              
the definition Wieland gives of willful ignorance, where he states, “​S​’s ignorance of p is willful                
if (i) ​p implies that ​A​, an action of ​S or another agent ​S​*, is wrong” (2017: 111). I diverge from                     
Wieland concerning this inconvenience condition because the majority instances of ​praiseworthy           
willful ignorance will not adhere to this condition. In instances of praiseworthy willful             
ignorance, ​S does not choose to remain ignorant because it is ​convenient to do so but because, for                  
example, they believe it’s the right thing to do. For this reason, and because this paper seeks to                  
give an accurate definition of willful ignorance (one that covers instances of blameworthy and              
praiseworthy willful ignorance), I must reject the idea that one chooses to engage in willful               
ignorance because knowledge of ​p ​is ‘inconvenient’.​6  
Instead, I suggest that all we need in order to solve the ‘paradox’ outlined above is that: ​S                  
knows that proposition ​p ​might be the case​.​7 This solves the problem because in knowing that                
something might be the case one can ​choose to ignore evidence confirming ​p (i.e. their ignoring                
can be ​willful​), while still remaining ​truly ignorant​ toward ​p​.  
  
1.2. Defining Willful Ignorance  
With my solution to the willful ignorance puzzle in hand, I suggest that willful ignorance should                
be explained as follows: 
S ​ is willfully ignorant regarding proposition ​p​ ​iff​:  
(i)​ ​S​ knows that proposition ​p​ might be the case; 
(ii)​ proposition ​p​ is available; 
(iii)​ knowledge of proposition ​p ​ is normatively relevant;  
(iv)​ ​S​ decides they wish to remain ignorant of proposition ​p​, for some reason ​R​;  
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 (v)​ ​S​ takes the appropriate steps, and is successful, in remaining ignorant of proposition ​p​.  
Allow me to explain ​(ii) - (v) in order to better understand how willful ignorance is defined. By                  
(ii)​, that proposition ​p is available, I mean that ​p can be obtained without an ​unreasonable                
amount of expectation on the part of ​S​.​8 By ‘unreasonable,’ I mean something like ​beyond the                
limits of reason, moderation, or fair expectation​. However, it’s important to note that there will               
be different constraints on this condition. First, there might be ​physical constraints on the              
availability of ​p ​. For instance, if proposition ​p is locked in a safe, and I cannot access the code, it                    
would be unreasonable to expect me to gain access to ​p​. Further, some propositions will be                
available to some (e.g. those with high-security clearance) and not to others (e.g. those without               
said security clearance). Similarly, it would be silly to expect someone to gain ​p​, if ​p were, e.g.                  
what it is like to give birth if the person did not have a uterus or vagina. There might also be                     
cognitive constraints on the availability of some proposition ​p​. For instance, I do not take it                
(outside the work of Science Fiction) that one is able to telepathically communicate with other               
humans, or non-human animals, to gain some ​p ​. Just as it would be unreasonable to expect a                 
person who does not read English to gain some ​p ​, e.g. the title of this paper, simply by placing                   
the paper in front of them. It should also be mentioned that some individuals have mental                
disorders or impairments that may make it extremely difficult (or even impossible) to gain              
knowledge of some ​p ​. And, reversely, that people without these impairments will not be able to                
gain knowledge of ​p​, where ​p​ is the knowledge of what it’s like to live with said impairments.  
There may also be ​time constraints on the availability of ​p ​. For instance, I do not have                 
access to the birth names of my grandchildren (or even the knowledge that they might, one day,                 
exist). However, time constraints might work in trickier ways. Elizabeth Harman gives us an              
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 illustration of what this might look like (2017: 118). Harman describes an instance where Emily,               
an engineer, is faced with a task of rescuing 10 people from a partially destroyed building. Emily                 
has the cognitive power, training, and proper tools at her disposal to save all 10 people trapped in                  
the building. However, because of time constraint ​t ( ​t being if she doesn’t act quickly all 10                 
people will die from suffocation), Emily manages to come up with Plan A, which only saves 9                 
people. If Emily had ​more time, it would be reasonable to expect her to come up with Plan B                   
(which saves all 10 people). However, it is ​unreasonable to expect her to spend an excessive                
amount of time searching for Plan A if the result would be that all 10 people should die.  
There might also be ​resource constraints ​on the availability of proposition ​p​. For             
instance, it would be unreasonable to expect an individual to spend their life savings to gain                
knowledge of proposition ​p if ​p was ‘when it will next snow in Montreal’. However, if the stakes                  
were higher and, e.g., an individual could spend their life savings in return for knowledge of ​p ​,                 
where ​p is the cure for cancer, it might become reasonable for that individual to trade their                 
savings to gain knowledge of ​p​. Resource constraints, as well as the constraints mentioned              
above, will vary from case-to-case and from person-to-person. It also happens that these different              
constraints may overlap or affect one another in different contexts, making it either more or less                
reasonable for ​S ​ to gain some proposition ​p.​9 
By ​(iii)​, that knowledge of proposition ​p is normatively relevant, I mean that acquiring              
knowledge of ​p will have direct bearing on what ​S ​ought to do. Let us use the example of the                    
parent and the peanut allergies to see how this condition works. The normatively relevant              
proposition in the peanut case was ‘children attending school X have deadly peanut allergies.’              
The acquisition of this proposition has a direct bearing on what the parent ​ought to do because it                  
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 directly affects the parents ability to avoid some evil by e.g., not sending their child to school                 
with peanut butter cookies that could potentially harm the children attending school X. Here, I               
allow that different normative ethical theories can act as a guide in determining what actions ​S                
ought to take (what actions should be considered praiseworthy or blameworthy (good or evil)).  
Conditions ​(iv) and ​(v) of the definition are more straightforward. Condition ​(iv)​, that ​S              
decides they wish to remain ignorant of proposition ​p for some reason ​R​, simply means that ​S                 
engages in willful ignorance and that some reason ​R motivates this decision. For instance, the               
parent in our peanut allergy example seems to be motivated by reason ​R​: this proposition doesn’t                
concern me or my child, or learning ​p ​is a waste of valuable time. Whereas condition (v) ​, that ​S                   
takes the appropriate steps to remain ignorant of proposition ​p​, means that ​S engages in and is                 
successful at being willfully ignorant of ​p​. These appropriate steps might be, e.g. the parent               
putting the allergy email in the trash, avoids listening to the school’s voicemail message, or               
recycling the Health Awareness flyer. In other instances, appropriate steps might be considered             
as, e.g. not looking for evidence (although one knows said evidence might be available), or               
refusing to ask questions that might lead to knowledge of ​p ​.  
 
II. BLAMEWORTHY & PRAISEWORTHY WILLFUL IGNORANCE  
Having defined willful ignorance and explained each condition, we are in a position to              
distinguish between blameworthy willful ignorance and praiseworthy willful ignorance. As          
stated above, there has been a vast amount of philosophical literature written on the topic of                
ignorance. In this section, I distinguish between different accounts of ignorance (both            
blameworthy and praiseworthy) in order to distinguish ​willful ignorance from related but distinct             
phenomena; as well as offer illustrations of blameworthy and praiseworthy willful ignorance.  
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2.1. An Account of Blameworthy Willful Ignorance  
As I’ve mentioned above, there have been many accounts of blameworthy (willful) ignorance             
provided by philosophers of law, social epistemologists, and critical race theorists. Here, it is              
important to distinguish between accounts of ​blameworthy ​ignorance​, ​blameworthy moral          
ignorance​, and ​blameworthy ​willful ignorance (that latter of which is the proper topic of this               
paper). 
2.1.1. Blameworthy Ignorance 
Although there has been a great deal written on ​blameworthy ignorance​, the degree of culpability               
associated with this kind of ignorance is still highly debated. In ​Nicomachean Ethics​, Aristotle              
suggests that it is the right of legislators to “punish those who are ignorant of any uncomplicated                 
point of law that they ought to have known” (1114a1-4). More recently, Holly Smith (1983)               
takes up the debate concerning culpable ignorance and provides the reader with an abundance of               
examples depicting blameworthy ignorance. Perhaps her most famous example is that of a doctor              
who accidentally administers too much oxygen, causing an infant to have permanent eye             
damage. In the example, the doctor is ignorant of the fact that too much oxygen would have this                  
effect, but ​would have known if they had read the latest issue of a medical journal. Smith states,                  
that in this case, “the doctor should have read his journal, and if he had done so, would have                   
realized he ought to use less oxygen” (1983: 543). I bring our attention to these examples of                 
blameworthy ignorance not to stake a claim in the culpability debate, but to show the difference                
between ​ignorance and ​willful ignorance​. In the examples above, although it is true that the               
individual is ignorant of some proposition ​p​, they are not ​willfully ignorant of ​p ​. This is because                 
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 they do not ​choose ​to be ignorant of ​p ​, i.e. condition ​(iv) ​of the definition is not fulfilled in these                    
cases. 
2.1.2. Blameworthy Moral Ignorance  
Concerning ​moral ignorance​, Elizabeth Harman (2011; 2017) suggests that while an individual            
might be ignorant of some moral truth, this does not mean that they are blameless for actions                 
resulting from said moral ignorance. However, directly opposed to Harman, some philosophers            
argue that... 
if [individuals] have thought hard about morality, if they are trying to act as they               
are morally required to act, and if it would be difficult for them to realize the                
moral truth then their moral ignorance renders them blameless for their morally            
wrong behavior.​10​ (Harman 2017: 117) 
Let us take Harman’s example of Sam the slaveholder to get a better grasp on this debate. In the                   
example, Sam the slaveholder holds slaves but “believes that slaveholding is not morally wrong”              
(Harman 2017: 118). We can expand on this example and imagine that Sam has grown up in a                  
time and place where it is the norm to keep slaves and that ​many people are morally ignorant                  
toward the fact that slaveholding is wrong. Those opposed to Harman would argue that, because               
Sam is ignorant of the moral fact that slaveholding is morally wrong, they should ​not be blamed                 
for holding slaves. That is, although Sam’s actions are in fact morally blameworthy, their moral               
ignorance exculpates. Harman, on the other hand, argues that moral ignorance does ​not exculpate              
and states that “beliefs (and failure to believe) are blameworthy if they involve inadequately              
caring about what is morally significant” (2011: 460). Sam is blameworthy, according to             
Harman, because (although ignorant of some moral fact) they display a level of ​inadequate care               
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 concerning the moral implications of slaveholding (i.e. that slaveholding is wrong). I don’t stake              
a claim in this debate but give it attention in order to show the difference between ​moral                 
ignorance ​(e.g. not knowing slaveholding is ​wrong ​), and ​ignorance of non-moral facts (e.g. not              
knowing Sam lives up the street). 
2.1.3. Blameworthy Willful Ignorance 
The proper topic of this paper are instances of ​willful ignorance toward some non-moral fact,               
which can be considered blameworthy (or praiseworthy).​11 Fortunately, the literature on willful            
ignorance is rich with instances of this kind of blameworthy willful ignorance. For example,              
Lynch (2016) discusses the case of Albert Speer, an architect for Hitler during WWII, who chose                
to be willfully ignorant toward the true horrors of the Holocaust (horrors to which he was a                 
contributing factor). After gaining testimonial evidence from his colleague Karl Hank﹣the           
testimony being that Hanke “advised him never to accept an invitation to inspect [a concentration               
camp] under any circumstances” (Lynch 2016: 505) ﹣ Speer certainly knew that it ​might be the                
case that what was happening in the concentration camps was horrifying. However, after gaining              
said testimony, Speer admits that he “did not investigate - for [he] did not want to know what                  
was happening there [...] from fear of discovering something which might have made [him] turn               
from [his] course” (Speer 1970: 376). 
Michele Moody-Adams (1994) provides us with another example of blameworthy willful           
ignorance. She describes an instance of a Mother “who repeatedly accepts expensive gifts from              
[her] teenage son with a modest income” (1994: 301). In the example, the teenage son is making                 
the money for the gifts by selling drugs, however, the mother chooses to remain willfully               
ignorant of this fact and accepts the gifts without investigating or questioning her son.  
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 Let us go through the examples described above, and see why they are exemplary of               
willful ignorance. In the case of Speer, it was true that Speer knew that ​(i) proposition ​p ​might be                   
the case​; that is, he knew that it might be the case that people in the concentration camps were                   
being mistreated (and possibly even murdered). It’s also true that proposition ​p was ​(ii) ​available.               
That is, if Speer ​had inspected one of the camps, or perhaps asked Hanke ​why he should never                  
accept an invitation to inspect, we can assume that Speer could have reasonably gained              
knowledge of ​p​. It is also the case that ​(iii) knowledge of ​p was normatively relevant; that is,                  
acquiring knowledge of ​p had direct bearing on what Speer ​ought to have done. In this case,                 
upon acquiring knowledge of ​p ​, Speer might have forced himself to try to make some positive                
change, or perhaps ceased working for the Nazi Party. Condition (iv) ​of the definition, that Speer                
wished to remain ignorant of proposition ​p ​, for some reason ​R​, also holds. That is, Speer wished                 
not to know for some reason ​R​, where ​R seems to be that Speer did not wish to discover                   
something that might make him ‘turn from his course.’ Lastly, the case fulfills ​(v)​, that S took                 
appropriate steps to remain ignorant of ​p​, as Speer himself admits: “I did not query [Hanke], I                 
did not query Himmler, I did not query Hitler, I did not speak with personal friends. I did not                   
investigate” (1970: 376).  
Moody-Adams’ example is also one of blameworthy willful ignorance. First, we can            
reason that the mother knew that it ​might be the case that her son was making money illegally (as                   
the gifts were too expensive to afford on a modest income). Further, proposition ​p ​, that the son                 
was buying the gifts with money he received from selling drugs, was available. If the mother                
investigated or took the time to question her son, she could reasonably gain knowledge of ​p ​.                
Knowledge of ​p​, in this case, is also normatively relevant. That is, knowledge of ​p had bearing                 
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 on what the Mother ought to have done. For instance, maybe she could have convinced her son                 
to stop distributing illegal drugs, or prevented her son from inevitable arrest. However, for some               
reason ​R​, the mother decided she wished to remain ignorant of proposition ​p​. We can imagine                
reason ​R ​being something like, e.g. she did not wish to confirm that her son was breaking the                  
law, she did not want to confront her son, or she didn’t want to have to report her son to                    
authorities.​12 Thus, the mother takes the appropriate steps to remain ignorant of proposition ​p ​;              
steps which are apparent in the mother’s readiness to “ask no questions about the state of affairs,                 
in spite of evidence that an inquiry may be needed in order to stop or prevent wrongdoing”                 
(Moody-Adams 1994: 301). 
 
2.2. An Account of Praiseworthy Willful Ignorance  
Unlike blameworthy accounts of ignorance, praiseworthy accounts of ignorance are harder to            
find in the literature. Here, it is important to distinguish between accounts of ​praiseworthy              
ignorance​, accounts of ​praiseworthy ​performed ignorance​, and accounts of ​praiseworthy ​willful           
ignorance​ (the latter of which is the proper topic of this paper).​13  
2.2.1. Praiseworthy Ignorance  
Cynthia Townley states that “while it may seem surprising that any form of ignorance can be an                 
epistemic good, ignorance is practically indispensable for a community of knowers and an             
account of ignorance is theoretically necessary for an adequate epistemology” (2011: x). Against             
those under the spell of ​epistemophilia​, Townley strives to give a positive account of ignorance               
(2006; 2011). Townley suggests that ignorance is imperative to the flourishing and existence of              
epistemic communities, and gives a treatment of the (positive) role ignorance plays in ​empathy              
(2006: 42-46).​14​ Townley suggests that... 
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 empathic knowledge must always be provisional, revisable, and modifiable. That          
is to say, in empathy there is a space of ignorance; my empathic knowledge is               
always incomplete. This ignorance is not provisional or strategic, rather it is            
intrinsic to empathy that even as I know, I am also ignorant. Successful empathic              
knowledge and the elimination of ignorance do not converge. (2006: 44)  
If one wishes to know some proposition ​p they can gain from another (or even a community of                  
knowers) different from themselves, one needs to realize that their knowledge of ​p will always               
be necessarily incomplete (or at least subject to revision). Townley suggests that this becomes              
increasingly apparent between individuals and groups that have different socioeconomic,          
racial, and/or gender positions within an epistemic community. This makes it so that “an              
epistemic agent who successfully makes an empathic knowledge claim is in the paradoxical             
position of saying ‘I know’ ​and ‘you can tell me that I am wrong” (Townley 2016: 45). That is,                   
one cannot completely know what it is like to exist as another individual (as their experiences,                
emotions, knowledge, and positionality are epistemically out of reach). Thus, in order to             
properly empathize, one must come to terms and even embrace this ‘space of ignorance’.              
Although Townley’s account is of positive ignorance, we should not conflate this with an              
account of praiseworthy willful ignorance. Instead, the ​simple ignorance Townley refers to is             
intrinsic to ‘epistemically responsible empathy’ (2006: 43). 
2.2.2. Praiseworthy Performed Ignorance 
Alison Bailey (2007), while discussing techniques available to oppressed groups resisting white            
ignorance,​15 gives a positive account of what she refers to as ​strategic ignorance​. Bailey              
proposes that “strategic ignorance is a way of expediently working with a dominant group’s              
14 
 tendency to see wrongly. It is a form of knowing that uses dominant misconceptions as a basis                 
for active creative responses to oppression” (2007: 88). An example of ​strategic ignorance could              
be the exploitation of the (white supremacist) misconception that people of color are ​by nature​,               
e.g., clumsy or uneducated/stupid. For instance, black workers in the Jim Crow era could seek               
revenge for poor wages by ‘accidentally’ breaking expensive objects belonging to their            
employers and, when confronted, escape punishment by pointing out that it was in their nature to                
be ‘clumsy’ (Bailey 2007: 88). They could also avoid responsibility and potential harm by              
pretending that they couldn’t read or ‘acting dumb’ when their employers confronted them with              
Civil Rights literature (Bailey 2007: 88).​16 Here, I would like to suggest that what Bailey refers                
to as ‘strategic ignorance’ is actually a kind of ​performed or ​pretended ​ignorance​. Bailey herself               
defines strategic ignorance as a ​kind of knowing that can be utilized by oppressed individuals to                
manipulate and exploit the unjust (white) ignorance of others. So, although what Bailey gives              
treatment to is a ​praiseworthy phenomenon, what she gives treatment to is not actual ignorance               
( ​ergo​, not willful ignorance).  
2.2.3. Praiseworthy Willful Ignorance  
We are now in the position to give an account of the kind of praiseworthy ​willful ignorance​. I                  
will proceed in the same way as the subsection on blameworthy willful ignorance; by providing               
examples of praiseworthy willful ignorance and then showing why they are exemplary of willful              
ignorance. As a first example, imagine a professor who has been asked to teach an introductory                
philosophy course. Recently, the professor has read literature concerning the positive outcomes            
of anonymous grading and, although they’ve never imposed anonymous grading before, they            
decide that it’s the right thing to do. When it comes time to distribute the topic of the first paper,                    
15 
 they ask students to provide their student number at the top of their paper instead of their first                  
and last name. They know that this will eliminate gaining proposition ​p ( ​p being this paper was                 
written by a student of gender X), and that this will help avoid assigning a gender to those papers                   
without gender-neutral names.  
Another example of praiseworthy willful ignorance could be as follows. A professor who             
teaches in California knows that the United States has recently made it ​extremely difficult for               
undocumented immigrants to continue to live in the United States. Further, they also know that it                
might be the case that some of their students are undocumented immigrants. Because of this, the                
professor decides they ​wish not to know ​the citizenship or residential status of as many of their                 
students as possible. The professor believes that it would be unjust if one of their students was                 
deported, so considers it the right thing to do to remain ignorant of any potentially jeopardizing                
information.  
In the first example, it’s clear that the professor knows that proposition ​p​, this paper was                
written by a student of gender X, ​might be the case​. It is also true that proposition ​p is available,                    
that is, if the professor desired they could reasonably acquire the names of the students and                
assign them to their papers. It’s also true, because of implicit biases and sexism, that knowledge                
of ​p is normatively relevant. In this case, acquiring knowledge of ​p directly affects what the                
professor ought to do because they wish to mark in the most neutral and fair way possible (or at                   
least try to minimize unintended biases into their marking; biases that are often attributed to               
gender, but also biases attached to certain races, ethnicities, or religions). The professor also              
wishes to remain ignorant of proposition ​p for some reason ​R​, where ​R ​might simply be in order                  
to ‘do the right thing’. And finally, we can see in the example above that the professor takes the                   
16 
 appropriate steps to remain ignorant of proposition ​p​, by asking their students to provide their               
student numbers instead of their names. 
Our second example also adheres to the definition of willful ignorance. First, the             
professor knows that proposition ​p ​, the existence of undocumented immigrants attending their            
classes, might be the case. They also know that ​p is available. That is, if they wished they could                   
reasonably attain the names of students who were undocumented. Further, knowledge of            
proposition ​p is normatively relevant. Where, in this case, acquiring knowledge of ​p ​will have a                
direct bearing on e.g., the professors ability to protect students from being deported against their               
will.​17 We can also see that the professor decides they wish to remain ignorant of ​p for some                  
reason ​R​, where ​R ​might be ‘I do not want to support the deportation of undocumented                
immigrants’.​18 Lastly, we can imagine that the professor takes appropriate steps in order to              
remain ignorant of proposition ​p​; perhaps ‘appropriate steps’ in this case are, e.g. avoiding              
student records, or not sharing grant information with students when the grant will expose their               
status or citizenship.​19 
 
III. WILLFUL IGNORANCE AND SELF-DECEPTION  
In this section, I propose that we can gain an even richer understanding of praiseworthy and                
blameworthy willful ignorance, by realizing their different relation to self-deception. In the first             
part of this section, I outline Kevin Lynch’s argument concerning self-deception and willful             
ignorance, where he suggests that willful ignorance and self-deception are ​two distinct            
psychological kinds (2016). In the second part, I argue that although it’s possible to understand               
praiseworthy willful ignorance and self-deception in the manner Lynch suggests, the same            
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 cannot be said for blameworthy willful ignorance. This is because, in cases of blameworthy              
willful ignorance, ​S will always be self-deceptive concerning the normative relevance of p.  
 
3.1. Lynch’s Account of Self-deception and Willful ignorance  
Lynch (2016) suggests that when willful ignorance is given treatment in mainstream philosophy             
it is often conflated with self-deception,​20 and makes it his aim to disentangle these two               
phenomena. Lynch believes that in drawing a sharp line between the two, we can “[see] that                
willful ignorance is different from self-deception in many ways: it involves, among other things,              
a different range of doxastic states, a different relation to evidence, [and] different behaviour”              
(2016: 507). As Lynch points out, it’s hard to give an analysis of a phenomenon like                
self-deception because there is disagreement on exactly how to define self-deception and what             
the paradigm cases are.​21 However, Lynch suggests there are “[two] features that are generally              
recognised to be present in paradigmatic self-deception” (2016: 513). Lynch’s methodology here            
is simple, he wishes to argue that willful ignorance and self-deception are two distinct              
psychological kinds by showing that willful ignorance does not adhere to these two features. The               
features Lynch identifies in paradigmatic self-deception are:  
1. The subject encounters evidence indicating that some true proposition, ​p ​, is true.  
2. She strongly desires that ​p​ is not true. (2016: 513)​22  
Let us take these features in turn and give treatment to the arguments Lynch provides, in order to                  
see why he considers willful ignorance and self-deception to be two distinct psychological kinds. 
Concerning the first feature, Lynch argues that the ​evidence one must encounter in cases              
of self-deception is the ​evidence one takes steps to strategically avoid in cases of willful               
ignorance. He states that “in willful ignorance, though such unwelcome evidence exists or             
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 potentially exists, the subject has avoided exposing himself to it. Such strong evidence has ​not               
been encountered” (2016: 517). That is, although willfully ignorant subjects know that ​p might              
be the case, they have not encountered evidence that warrants the truth of ​p ​. Contrariwise, in                
cases of paradigmatic self-deception, the subject has encountered concrete evidence confirming           
p​. The following is an example to better illustrate this point.  
Jasmine, an individual who knows that breast cancer runs in her family, comes to realize               
that having breast cancer ​might be the case because of symptoms she’s recently experienced. If               
Jasmine visits a doctor who confirms that she has breast cancer, and gives her testimonial               
evidence of ​p ( ​p being her testing positive for breast cancer), Jasmine might choose to convince                
herself of not-​p ​. For example, she might tell herself the doctor is not adequately trained, or that                 
the doctor must have read the scans wrong. This would be an illustration of paradigmatic               
self-deception.​23 However, if Jasmine (knowing that breast cancer might be the case because of              
symptoms she’s recently experienced) refused to see the doctor, avoided future check-ups, and             
even refused to carry out a self-examination for breast cancer, we could say that she was, instead,                 
willfully ignorant of her breast cancer. Lynch suggests that... 
This difference is quite important: it is the reason why we associate different             
behaviours with these phenomena, partly making them different ‘psychological         
kinds’. Willful ignorance is a matter of steering clear of evidence. Self-deception,            
however, is a matter of maintaining a belief in the face of contrary evidence.              
(2016: 518)  
Concerning the second feature of self-deception, that the subject strongly desires that ​p is not               
true, Lynch argues desiring that not-​p “does not seem to be a necessary feature of willful                
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 ignorance” (2016: 517). In the case of Albert Speer, Lynch admits that Speer may have desired                
that people were ​not being murdered in the camps he helped build (i.e. not-​p ​). However, Lynch                
urges us to imagine cases of willful ignorance where the second feature does not hold. For                
instance, Lynch gives us the example of a corporate boss who tells their employees to gain some                 
result using ​any means necessary (2016: 517). In this example, the boss tells their employees               
they do not wish to know ​how the result is achieved but realizes that it ​might be the case the law                     
is broken while achieving said result. This gives the boss a certain amount of ‘deniability’ if                
questioned on how the results were obtained (Lynch 2016: 517). Lynch argues that, in this               
example of willful ignorance, it’s easy to imagine that the boss “could not care less whether ​p or                  
not-​p​; he just wants the results to be achieved” (2016: 517). So, although Lynch admits that in                 
some ​cases of willful ignorance it holds that ​S desires that p is not true (like in the Speer case),                    
he proposes that this is not a necessary feature of willful ignorance.  
 
3.2. The Normative Relevance Account of Self-deception and Willful ignorance  
When we compare ​praiseworthy willful ignorance and self-deception, I am in agreement with             
Lynch that these are two distinct psychological kinds. However, when we analyze ​blameworthy             
willful ignorance and self-deception, I argue that we should not consider them in the way Lynch                
suggests. First, I wish to show that blameworthy willful ignorance always involves some             
self-deception on the part of ​S ​, because ​S ​will always be self-deceptive concerning the normative               
relevance of p ​. After which, I will argue that praiseworthy willful ignorance never involves              
self-deception concerning the normative relevance of ​p​.  
3.2.1. Blameworthy Willful Ignorance and Self-Deception 
20 
 To defend the argument that blameworthy willful ignorance always involves some           
self-deception, I will utilize the two features found in all cases of paradigmatic self-deception. I               
propose that blameworthy willful ignorance always involves self-deception because: 
1. The subject encounters evidence indicating that some true proposition, ​p​, is ​normatively            
relevant​. 
2. They strongly desire that ​p ​ is ​not normatively relevant​ (i.e. ​normatively irrelevant​).​24  
Allow me to take a familiar example to help better illustrate this argument. In the Speer example,                 
Speer heard some testimony which made him believe that some proposition ​p ​might be the case                
(where ​p = there are horrific acts taking place in the concentration camps). However, instead of                
giving ​p ​further consideration (e.g. seeking further evidence), Speer strongly desired that            
proposition ​p be ​normatively irrelevant​. That is, he desired that ​p be closer to a descriptive claim                 
which held no moral significance. Here, we can see that Speer exhibits behaviors typically              
associated with self-deception, such as “being hypercritical, rationalising, and explaining away           
evidence” (Lynch 2016; 518). Perhaps Speer rationalized that although there ​were ​people being             
held in the camps, they were all being well fed and well looked after. If this were the case, Speer                    
wouldn’t (necessarily) need to know this information because there was no normative judgment             
that needed to be made (no right action that should have been pursued/no wrong action that                
should have been avoided). That is, Speer remained willfully ignorant of ​p because he convinced               
himself that ​p was normatively irrelevant, making it the case that no further investigation was               
necessary. 
Concerning cases of blameworthy willful ignorance like the Corporate Boss, I propose            
that these cases involve self-deception as well. This is because the corporate boss still ​strongly               
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 desires that ​p (where ​p = the results were achieved in an unlawful way) be normatively                
irrelevant. We can imagine that if the boss was met with evidence suggesting that ​p were                
normatively relevant, we could expect the boss to engage in exactly the kind of self-deceptive               
behavior Lynch refers to, by ‘maintaining a belief in the face of contrary evidence’ in order to                 
preserve deniability. Like Speer, we can imagine the boss rationalizing that although the desired              
results ​were achieved, they were likely achieved by lawful means. That is, they strongly desire               
that ​p be normatively irrelevant, making acquiring knowledge of ​p unnecessary because it has no               
direct bearing on what they ​ought to do (e.g., ensure that the results were achieved in a lawful                  
way, avoid having their employees fired and/or incriminated, having themselves fired and/or            
incriminated, having the company audited, etc.).​25  
From the examples above it becomes clear that, in cases of blameworthy willful             
ignorance, the issue becomes that of ​S​’s self-deceptive attitude toward the normative relevance             
of ​p ​. That is, in cases of blameworthy willful ignorance, ​S can remain willfully ignorant of ​p and,                  
at the same time, 1) encounter evidence indicating that some true proposition, ​p​, is normatively               
relevant, and 2) strongly desire that ​p ​ is normatively irrelevant.  
3.2.2. Praiseworthy Willful Ignorance and Self-Deception 
Contrary to blameworthy willful ignorance, I suggest that praiseworthy willful ignorance never            
involves self-deception concerning the normative status of ​p​. Rather, in instances of            
praiseworthy willful ignorance:  
1. The subject encounters evidence indicating that some true proposition, ​p ​, is ​normatively            
relevant​. 
2. They ​do not​ strongly desire that ​p ​ is ​normatively irrelevant​. 
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 Let us take the example of the California professor to better illustrate this point. In our example,                 
the professor ​knows that proposition ​p (where ​p = the existence undocumented immigrants             
attending their classes) holds normative weight, and further, that if they acquire ​p it will have a                 
direct bearing on what they ought to do. So, although the professor has encountered evidence of                
the normative relevance of ​p​, they don’t strongly desire that ​p be normatively irrelevant. Quite               
the contrary, the professor understands and fully accepts the normative relevance of ​p​, and thus               
decides to remain willfully ignorant of ​p ​. The same is true in our example of anonymous grading.                 
In this example, the professor recognizes that ​p might be the case (where ​p = students have                 
names which might not be gender-neutral), and fully accepts the normative relevance of ​p ​.              
Opposed to individuals engaging in blameworthy willful ignorance, there is no need for             
praiseworthy individuals to engage in behaviors typically associated with self-deception. These           
individuals are fully aware of the fact that ​p is normatively relevant, so there is no reason to be                   
hypercritical, rationalize, or explain away evidence that indicates the normative relevance of ​p ​. 
From the discussion above, I hope it is clear that blameworthy willful ignorance and              
praiseworthy willful ignorance have different relations to self-deception. On both accounts, when            
S decides whether they wish to know proposition ​p​, the praiseworthy and the blameworthy              
individuals can both answer ‘No!’ However, when pressed and asked ​why they wish not to know​,                
the praiseworthy willfully ignorant individual fully accepts that avoiding proposition ​p ​is            
necessary because ​p is normatively relevant. Whereas the blameworthy willfully ignorant           
individual, having encountered evidence that proposition ​p is normatively relevant, ​strongly           
desires that the ​p be normatively irrelevant. For this reason, blameworthy willful ignorance             
involves self-deception because it adheres to both features of paradigmatic self-deception,           
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 whereas praiseworthy willful ignorance does not involve self-deception because it fails to adhere             
to the second feature. 
 
IV. OBJECTIONS  
4.1. The Republican  
Objection​: ​In the California Professor example it’s suggested that the professor is praiseworthy             
for their willful ignorance, the question here is: ​praiseworthy for whom and under what              
normative framework? ​For example, we can imagine an onlooker to this situation as being a               
staunch Republican. According to ​their normative framework, the professor would actually be            
blameworthy for their willful ignorance. This is because what the professor ​ought to do is learn                
the status of their students and notify ICE upon learning if any of their students are not American                  
Citizens (or without proper documentation). Here, the question concerns how this account deals             
with conflicting intuitions of what is considered praiseworthy and blameworthy (as a result of              
diverging normative frameworks).  
Response: ​This objection arises from the fact that our intuitions about whether the California              
professor is blameworthy or praiseworthy are divided. That is, from the Republican view the              
professor is blameworthy, and from a more Democratic view the professor is praiseworthy.             
However, there is a clarification that needs to be made before we proceed. What the Republican                
takes issue with is that the California professor is blameworthy for being ignorant toward some               
moral fact (the moral fact being that ​deportation is the right action to take​). For argument's sake,                 
let’s say the Republican has the correct normative framework (and that deportation is the right               
action to take). Here, there are two options, both of which my theory can account for.  
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 First, it might be the case that the California professor is ​genuinely ignorant of the moral                
fact that deportation is the right action. That is, the professor has not been met with any evidence                  
suggesting that deportation-as-right-action might be the case. Perhaps the professor has grown up             
in a time and place that only allows for Democratic values, and that this results in the professor’s                  
ignorance. In this case, it can be debated whether or not the professor should be blameworthy for                 
their genuine moral ignorance (as we’ve seen from the discussion concerning moral ignorance             
above). However, the professor is not ​willfully ignorant toward said moral fact, thus making it               
impossible for the them to be blameworthy for their willful ignorance toward the moral fact that                
deportation is the right action.  
But what if the California professor ​is willfully ignorant toward the moral fact that              
deportation is the right action (that is, the professor fulfills conditions ​(i)-(v) ​outlined above)? If,               
as we said, the Republican has the correct normative framework, then under my account there is                
no reason why the California professor could not be considered blameworthy for their willful              
ignorance. However, as stated elsewhere in this paper, self-deception works differently in these             
cases. That is, self-deception still co-occurs with blameworthy willful ignorance because the            
professor is self-deceptive about the moral fact that ‘deportation is the right action to take’ (i.e.,                
1. They are met with evidence indicating some true moral proposition, ​p​, is true; and 2. They                 
strongly desire that ​p​ is not true).  
 
4.2. Outcomes Attributed to Willful Ignorance  
Objection: ​Above it is mentioned that in remaining willfully ignorant toward the citizenship and              
status of their students, the California professor refuses to share grant information with their              
students. In response to this, one could argue that not sharing grant opportunities with students is                
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 actually quite detrimental and should, therefore, not be considered any part of a praiseworthy              
action.  
Response: ​It will be a necessary part of the account that sometimes willful ignorance will result                
in ​unintended positive ​and/or negative outcomes​. For instance, in the example of the California              
professor, I take it that the professor is still praiseworthy for their willful ignorance and that the                 
act of not sharing grant information should be considered an ​accidental negative outcome​. We              
can also imagine instances where blameworthy willful ignorance results in ​accidental positive            
outcomes​. Let’s take Moody-Adams example of Mother and Son Drug-Dealer to better illustrate             
this point. Suppose the mother, knowing it might be the case that her son is dealing drugs, stops                  
asking the son questions about his personal life (for fear an answer might expose p ​). Although it                 
unsettles the mother to no longer acquire about her son's life, the son is quite pleased with this                  
result, as he considered his mom a ‘total nag’ in the past. Because the mom no longer asks so                   
many questions, the son warms up to his mother and they start spending more time together.                
Here, I consider the son and mother growing closer to be positive, however, it is a direct result of                   
the mother’s blameworthy willful ignorance (making this an ​accidental positive outcome​).  
I do not believe the existence of accidental positive or negative outcomes poses a threat               
to my overall account. However, one might point out that these outcomes could potentially              
outweigh the ‘good’ or ‘bad’ being sought by the initial act of willful ignorance. For instance,                
say someone is initially willfully ignorant toward some ​p​, and that their willful ignorance is               
praiseworthy. However, the accumulation of accidental negative outcomes makes it so their act             
of praiseworthy willful ignorance is actually resulting in more harm than good. If said individual               
knows that such accidental negative outcomes ​might be the case​, yet chooses to ignore said               
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 outcomes (convincing themselves, instead, that the truth of said outcomes is a ​p which is               
normatively irrelevant), than I would argue that this new instance of willful ignorance is              
blameworthy (despite the individuals initial praiseworthy engagement in willful ignorance).​26  
 
4.3. Two Sisters 
This objection centers around a thought experiment like this: 
A woman of color lives in a minority community (this community is also made up of people                 
of color) within a larger population that is extremely racist toward said minority community.              
The community continues to dwell in this larger population because it affords them job              
opportunities they could not find elsewhere; which, in turn, affords them a higher standard of               
living. The woman knows that it ​might be the case that her sister is being abused by her                  
husband. Thus, the woman has two options: 1) confirm that her sister is being abused, tell the                 
authorities and stop the abuse; however, in doing so, this will further perpetuate the negative               
stereotype that men of said community are abusive, dangerous, aggressive, and violent. In             
turn, making it harder for the community to flourish because of the extreme racism/biases              
inherent in the dominant population. Or, 2) choose to be willfully ignorant of her sister’s               
abuse in order to preserve the community’s (already dismal) status and stability. However,             
this option would allow the sister’s abuse to continue.​27 
Objection: ​The objection here is that this example seems to provide an illustration of willful               
ignorance that is both praiseworthy ​and blameworthy. In the case that the woman chooses to               
ignore to abuse of her sister, she saves the community’s status and is thus praiseworthy for her                 
willful ignorance. That is, she recognizes that acquiring knowledge of proposition ​p is             
normatively relevant and chooses to be willfully ignorant of ​p in order to protect her community.                
27 
 However, in the act of remaining ignorant toward her sister’s abuse, she is blameworthy because               
she avoids acquiring knowledge of proposition ​p (which could help stop the abuse) and, instead,               
strongly desires that ​p be normatively irrelevant (e.g., something closer to a descriptive claim              
like ‘my sister and her husband have never abused one another’).  
Response: ​What I would like to suggest in response to this objection is that one would have to                  
look at the ​specific context at work in this example. For instance, again, assuming that the                
woman does not wish her sister be harmed, it would be up to the woman to decide if the                   
consequences would be beneficial enough for her to willfully ignore her sister’s abuse (or              
beneficial enough to allow the reputation of the community to be sullied). For example, say that                
the woman was aware that dominant group had grown increasingly hostile and aggressive toward              
her community. So much so, that she knew of several men of color who had been severely                 
beaten and some who had even been killed at the hands of the dominant group. Suppose there                 
had even been a threat recently that if community’s ‘aggressive behavior’ persisted, the             
authorities would have to implement new laws which would allow police officers to arrest and               
detain men from that community without justification. If we get clearer on the context in which                
this thought experiment is supposed to take place, we can see that the woman’s justification, as                
well as w ​hat is at stake ​(e.g., increasing happiness and safety for the greatest number of people),                 
will be extremely important in determining whether this is an instance of praiseworthy or              
blameworthy willful ignorance. 
I don’t take it to be a pitfall of my account that it should sometimes appeal to a kind of                    
contextualism. Contrary, many of the authors listed above have argued for the importance of              
realizing that moral and epistemic agents are always ​situated (Alcoff 2007; Code 1993, 1995;              
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 Harding 1991; Mills 1997, 2007). So, although I provide an account that is meant to hold for                 
cases of willful ignorance, I do not pretend that ​S ​’s situatedness will not play a crucial role in                  
whether their willful ignorance is deemed blameworthy or praiseworthy. 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS  
I hope this paper has satisfied the three objectives with which it started, these were (1) propose                 
an adequate definition of willful ignorance (one that holds for accounts of blameworthy ​and              
praiseworthy willful ignorance), (2) show that there at (at least) two kinds of willful ignorance,               
and (3) illuminate the fact that blameworthy willful ignorance always involves a cognitive             
element, namely, self-deception. I believe that in allowing a kind of praiseworthy willful             
ignorance to be part of the conversation, we will only gain a better understanding of the                
phenomenon of willful ignorance as a whole.  
ENDNOTES 
1. The scholars mentioned are not meant to act as exhaustive lists, however, they do provide the                 
reader with a  list of preliminary readings concerning philosophy and ignorance. 
2. All the scholars thus far, with the exception of Alison Bailey (2007) and Cynthia Townley                
(2006, 2011), have focused on accounts of blameworthy (willful) ignorance. 
3. I say ‘at least’ because I think there is potential for a third kind of willful ignorance, which I                    
will call ​neutral ​willful ignorance. Included in this category are acts like not spoiling the end of a                  
mystery novel for oneself or a couple choosing not to know the sex of their unborn child.                 
However, because this paper is concerned with the moral dimension of willful ignorance (i.e.              
 praiseworthiness and ​blameworthiness​), giving treatment to a kind of neutral willful ignorance            
will not be its central concern.  
4. Cynthia Townley defines ​epistemophilia ​as “the love of knowledge to the point of myopia”               
(2006: 38), and suggests that when knowledge is “taken in excess, it can and has limited the                 
understanding of epistemic practices and values, because increasing knowledge is not always            
good, and not the only epistemic good” (2011: xii).  
5. One might ask why this illustration could not be due to the parent’s negligence, or the                 
parent’s recklessness? It is important to be able to distinguish between negligence, recklessness,             
and willful ignorance. Where recklessness “involves acting while aware of a substantial and             
unjustifiable risk or harm or another inculpatory fact,” negligence involves acting while being             
unaware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk or harm or another inculpatory fact, although said               
risk ​should have been known (Sarch 2018: 3). To illustrate, say a teen hurls a rock over an                  
overpass and onto a busy highway below, which results in the death of a driver. If the teen was                   
aware of the risk they might kill a driver when they hurled the rock, this would be considered an                   
act of recklessness. However, if for some reason, the teen was ​unaware of the risk that their                 
action might kill (or even harm) a driver, this would be considered an act of negligence. I would                  
like to propose that cases of willful ignorance can involve either negligence or recklessness (in               
different degrees), however, willful ignorance is different in the way the actor deliberately takes              
steps to ignore evidence that would result in knowledge of ​p​. So, regardless of whether our                
parent was aware that sending their child to ​any school with a batch of peanut butter cookies was                  
risky, or whether they were generally unaware of this risk, the parent took steps to deliberately                
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 ignore ​p ( ​p being that children attending school X have deadly peanut allergies), knowledge              
which the parent ​could​ and ​should​ have known.  
6. One might argue that knowledge of ​p could be considered ‘inconvenient’ in cases of               
praiseworthy willful ignorance, because gaining knowledge of ​p ​would inhibit ​S from, e.g. doing              
the right thing. In this way, knowledge of ​p can be seen as inconvenient, undesirable, unwanted,                
or unwelcome (as it prevents someone from taking some action they wish to take). However, I                
still cannot agree that people choose to engage in praiseworthy willful ignorance because it is               
convenient for them to do so. For instance, I don’t think a professor would implement               
anonymous grading out of convenience. In fact, it seems like a greater ​inconvenience for the               
professor to have to explain and enforce anonymous grading in their classroom. Exactly why              
anonymous grading counts as an example of praiseworthy willful ignorance will become clearer             
in section II. 
7. In knowing that something ​might be the case I wish to make it explicit that this does not mean                    
that ​S must be constantly conscious of the fact that ​p might be the case, or even that ​S has                    
meditated or thought about ​p being the case for any period of time. Rather, in knowing that                 
something ​might be the case​, ​S must know that ​p is empirically probable, and that ​p ​is available                  
to them (more on the ​availability ​of ​p​ in the following section).  
8. I acknowledge that ‘unreasonable’ is a highly debated term, especially in philosophy of law.               
However, I do not wish to take up this debate here. For the debate (in law) concerning the ‘Duty                   
of Reasonable Investigation’, see Husak (2010) and Sarch (2015; 2017). For the debate (in law)               
concerning what constitutes a ‘reasonable person’, see Sifferd (2018). For an overview of the              
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 debate (in philosophy) concerning the ‘Reasonable Expectation Criterion’, see FitzPatrick          
(2017).  
9. For example, given my 9-year-old sister’s cognitive abilities, current resources, and under a              
time constraint of say, five minutes, it would be unreasonable to expect her to know whether she                 
identifies as a virtue ethicist. However, if we shifted the time constraint and gave her 20 years to                  
gain knowledge of ​p ( ​p being whether she identifies as a virtue ethicist), the availability of ​p                 
becomes more reasonable for my sister to obtain. However, we can also imagine a number of                
situations where, even given the new time constraint of 20 years, it may remain unreasonable for                
my sister to gain knowledge of ​p ​. For example, maybe my sister never gains the resources to buy                  
books on virtue ethics or lacks the funding to get the proper virtue-ethics-education. Perhaps one               
of our parents falls ill and my sister decides to spend her cognitive abilities and resources                
learning how to properly care for them.  
10.  For a defence of this view see Rosen (2003, 2004).  
11. This is not to say that someone couldn’t be ​willfully ignorant ​toward some moral fact​. For                 
instance, someone might ​take the appropriate steps ​to stay ignorant toward the moral fact that               
slaveholding is wrong by, e.g. ignoring anti-slavery literature, leaving the room when someone             
announces they will be making an argument against slaveholding, or perhaps putting someone             
else in charge of punishing their slaves (as to not have to see the reaction of said slaves). I do not                     
deny that there may be overlap between willful ignorance and moral ignorance; I only suggest               
that the main topic of this paper will be the treatment of willful ignorance toward non-moral                
facts. 
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 12. Jan Willem Wieland (2016) gives a treatment of this example, where he suggests that the                
mother’s motivation (i.e ​R​) is based on ‘other-interest’ rather than ‘self-interest’ (110). However,             
I believe that the example works either way; the mother could be motivated by ‘other-interest’               
(e.g. she loves her son and wishes to keep him out of trouble), or she could be motivated by                   
‘self-interest’ (e.g. perhaps she enjoyed the expensive gifts and wanted to receive more).  
13. I acknowledge that there may also be instances of ​praiseworthy moral ignorance​, however, a               
great deal more would need to be said in order to argue for this. I mention it as a possibility as to                      
not rule it out, however, I do not wish to spend time arguing for it here. 
14. Townley also gives a treatment of the positive role ignorance plays in ​trust (see 2006:                
42-46); and later discusses the positive role ignorance plays in the ‘epistemic virtues’ she names               
as ​trust​,​ empathy​, ​cooperation​, ​deference​,​ discrimination​, and ​discretion​ (Townley, 2011).  
15. Charles W. Mills defines white ignorance as a kind of “non-knowing, that is not contingent,                
but in which race, white racism and/or white racial domination and their ramifications - plays a                
crucial causal role” (2007: 20). 
16. Both these examples come from Robin Kelley’s book ​Race Rebels: Culture, Politics, and              
the Black Working Class​ (1994). 
17. Here, one might argue that this would ​not be an example of praiseworthy willful ignorance                
according to the view, e.g. ‘undocumented immigrants ​ought to be deported.’ I understand that              
this is a very serious concern, which is why I take it up in subsection 4.1.  
18. It’s possible to imagine cases where the professor does not investigate ​p for selfish reasons.                
For example, maybe the professor does not want to be bothered having to report a student so they                  
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 steer clear of any evidence confirming ​p​. If this is the case, I am willing to argue that this is                    
actually a case of blameworthy willful ignorance.  
19. Here, one could argue that ​not sharing grant information with students is actually very bad                
and should not be considered praiseworthy. I acknowledge that this is a concern, which is why I                 
take it up in subsection 4.2.  
20. Lynch provides the reader with a substantial list of examples (2016: 506-507). For instance,               
Nancy Tuana describes willful ignorance as “a systematic process of self-deception” (2006: 11). 
21. For those who require at least a minimal definition of self-deception, self-deception is              
defined as “[involving] a person who seems to acquire and maintain some false belief in the teeth                 
of evidence to the contrary as a consequence of some motivation, and who may display behavior                
suggesting some awareness of the truth” (Deweese-Boyd, 2017). 
22. It’s important to note that these features (although always present in cases of self-deception)               
are not jointly sufficient for self-deception. But that these two features leading ​S to believe that ​p                 
is not true will also be necessary for self-deception.  
23. Further, this example would fall under the ​unwarranted belief account ​of self-deception.             
This account holds that a subject is self-deceptive when they “end up believing that not-​p ​,               
against the thrust of the evidence, after treating that evidence unjustly” (Lynch 2016: 513). There               
are also ​implicit knowledge accounts of self-deception and ​intermediate accounts ​of           
self-deception (Lynch 2016: 513-517). However, we need not give a treatment of these distinct              
accounts as they all share the two features of self-deception Lynch identifies.  
24. If ​S considers ​p to be normatively ​relevant​, it means that ​S recognizes that acquiring                
knowledge of ​p will have direct bearing on what ​S ought to do,. Reversely, if ​S considers ​p to be                    
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 normatively ​irrelevant​, it means ​S recognizes that acquiring knowledge of ​p has no direct              
bearing on what ​S​ ought to do. 
25. I believe this is the most intuitive way to imagine this case, that the boss strongly desires that                    
p be closer to a descriptive claim (e.g. the results were achieved in a lawful way). However, for                  
arguments sake, we can imagine a situation where the boss ​truly does not care whether ​p ​or ​not-p                  
(i.e. whether ​p is ‘the results were achieved in an unlawful way’ or ‘the results were achieved in                  
a lawful way’). In this case, it may look as if the boss avoids confirming ​p because they know                   
that ​p ​is normatively relevant, i.e. that ​p will directly affect what they ought to do. However,                 
even in these special cases, I’d like to propose that self-deception still co-occurs with              
blameworthy willful ignorance. In this illustration, the boss becomes self-deceptive concerning           
the ​moral fact that, e.g. one should not use their position of power to force others to do                  
wrong/evil. That is, 1. The boss is met with evidence indicating some true moral proposition, ​p ​,                
is true; and 2. They strongly desire that ​p ​ is not true.  
26. If the person is instead simply ignorant of said accidental negative outcomes, this would               
mean that they could be considered blameworthy for their ignorance but would not be considered               
willfully ignorant​ toward said outcomes. 
27. This thought experiment was inspired by Kimberlé Crenshaw’s article “Mapping the            
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